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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of costly taxation on the fiscal response of local
governments to intergovernmental transfers. Using a panel dataset of Peruvian mu-
nicipalities, I find robust evidence that central government’s grants have a greater
stimulatory effect in municipalities facing higher tax collection costs. The results
are consistent with costly taxation partially explaining the flypaper effect.
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1 Introduction
One of the most documented empirical regularities in the fiscal federalism literature is the
so-called flypaper effect (Hines and Thaler, 1995; Gamkhar and Shah, 2007). This effect
refers to the non-equivalence of different sources of local revenue. In particular, local
public spending is more responsive to increments in grants from the central government
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than to increments in the local tax base.1 In the traditional grants-in-aid theoretical
framework, however, these findings are puzzling (Oates, 1999). If money is fungible and
the local government represents the interests of the citizens, then both sources of revenue
should be equivalent (Bradford and Oates, 1971).
The most accepted explanations of this phenomenon focus on failure of local politicians
to reflect voters’ interests, or on empirical flaws in the estimation of the effect of grants
on spending.2 A complementary argument, first proposed by Hamilton (1986), suggests
instead that the flypaper effect may be due to costly taxation.3 There is, however, scant
empirical evidence evaluating this hypothesis.
In this paper, I explore empirically whether costly local taxation affects the respon-
siveness of local spending to grants. In order to motivate the empirical exercise, I first
develop a simple model of local public spending with costly tax collection, similar in
spirit to Hamilton’s (1986) model. The model predicts that the responsiveness of local
spending to grants increases with tax collection costs. I then test this prediction using
a panel dataset of Peruvian district municipalities over the period 1999 to 2001. Munic-
ipalities are the lowest tier of autonomous sub-national government. They finance their
budget mostly from two sources: local revenue (such as property taxes, fees, fines and
contributions) and transfers from the central government
I focus on the Municipal Compensation Fund or Foncomun, a large nationwide equal-
ization grant managed by the central government. This grant is funded with a share of
the national value added tax and allocated to municipalities using a pre-defined formula.
The empirical strategy exploits within-municipality variation in the Foncomun grant. As
1A similar phenomenon is reported in the aid literature, see for example Van de Walle and Mu (2007).
2The discrepancy between voters and local politicians may be due to imperfect information (Courant
et al., 1979; Oates, 1979), uncertainty (Turnbull, 1998) or the action of agenda setting budget-maximizing
bureaucrats (Filimon et al., 1982). More recently, Singhal (2008) finds evidence linking the flypaper effect
to the influence of interest groups. Some of the empirical flaws mentioned in the literature are functional
miss-specification (Becker, 1996), omitted variables (Hamilton, 1983), reverse causality (Knight, 2002)
and measurement error (Moffitt, 1984). For a detailed survey of the literature see Hines and Thaler
(1995), or Gamkhar and Shah (2007).
3In Hamilton’s model, local governments treat local income and grants differently, because local taxes
create distortionary costs. The argument, however, applies broadly to any difference in the cost of public
funds. For example, Dahlby (2011) develops a model where differences in the marginal cost of public
funds between the central and local governments generate the flypaper effect.
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a proxy for tax collection costs, I use an indicator of tenure of administrative tools such
as an automated tax system or an updated cadaster.
I find evidence that municipalities facing higher tax collection costs are more respon-
sive to additional grants. The most conservative estimates suggest that the propensity
to spend out of grants for a low cost municipality ranges between 0.515 to 0.785, de-
pending on the model specification. In contrast, the propensity to spend for high cost
municipalities ranges between 0.736 to 0.956. Under the assumption that the propensity
to spend out of local income is 0.10, these results can be interpreted as evidence that
costly taxation explains around 20% of the flypaper effect.
The results are robust to relevant identification concerns such as time-invariant omit-
ted variables and confounding factors associated to the measure of tax collection costs.
This evidence is consistent with the argument that grants and local tax base are non-
equivalent, at least in part, because of costly taxation.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the analytical framework.
Section 3 describes the institutional background about Peruvian local governments. Sec-
tion4 discusses the data and identification strategy. Section 5 presents the main results
and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 A model of local spending
In this section I develop a simple model of local public spending with costly tax collection.
The model is based on the standard political economy model of public finance used by
Persson and Tabellini (2000) in their analysis of redistributive politics. I extend this basic
framework by including costly tax collection and lump-sum grants.
The model emphasizes the role of costly taxation as a mechanism to generate non-
equivalence of revenue sources. This mechanism is similar to the one proposed by Hamil-
ton (1986).4 There are, however, two differences that make the model more suitable for
4In Hamilton’s model, the local public good is financed by a combination of local income taxes and
grants from the central government. Local taxation is distortionary and creates a deadweight loss that
reduces citizens net income. This feature makes the propensity to spend out of grants greater than out
of local income, because grants allow the local government to reduce distortionary taxation and increase
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empirical testing.
First, the model motivates costly taxation by introducing tax collection costs, such
as compliance or administrative costs. This is a natural extension of Hamilton’s model
that facilitates the empirical analysis, since collection costs are easier to measure than
distortionary costs. Moreover, in the context of local public finances, tax collections
costs might be as relevant as the distortionary costs of taxation (Slemrod, 1990, p.169).5
Second, the model provides a simple expression linking the grant elasticity of spending to
tax collection costs, tax rates and the ratio of grant to non-grant revenue. These features
motivate the use of alternative variables to evaluate the role of costly taxation in the
fiscal responsiveness to grants.
There are two tiers of government: central and local. Both provide public goods,
collect taxes and have their representatives elected in general elections. In addition, the
central government provides financial support to local governments in the form of lump-
sum grants. I focus on the policy decisions of the local government and take the central
government’s policies as given.6 This assumption implies that the local politician does
not take into account the costs incurred by the central government to fund the grant
scheme.
The local government rules over a community populated by a continuum of citizens
of mass one. Citizens have similar income ei = 1, but heterogeneous type. Their type is
denoted by yi. The individual type defines the tax she will pay and can be interpret as
the value of her property.7 In order to abstract from the effect of individual inequality,
I restrict attention to symmetric distributions such that both the average and median yi
are equal to y8
citizens’ consumption.
5For example, estimates of the compliance and administrative costs of the U.S. federal and state
income tax are between 5-10 percent of total tax revenue (Slemrod and Sorum, 1984; Blumenthal and
Slemrod, 1992; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). In the case of local governments, Wicks and Killwort
(1967) estimate collection costs for real property taxes of around 9.5 percent of the tax revenue. For an
empirical survey of compliance and administrative costs see Sandford (1995).
6This is a plausible assumption if local governments are unable to, individually, affect central govern-
ment’s policies.
7In the Peruvian case the most important local tax is the property tax.
8The results are similar with asymmetric distributions. This extension is available from the author
upon request.
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Citizens derive utility from private consumption ci and a homogeneous public good
g provided by the local government. Preferences are defined by a quasi-linear utility
function
Ui = ci +H(g), (1)
where the utility from the public good H(g) is an increasing and concave function.
The assumption of a quasi-linear utility is used in several models of political econ-
omy and public finance (see for example Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Persson
and Tabellini (2000).) This functional form simplifies the model significantly and allows
us to obtain a more tractable expression linking tax collection costs to public spend-
ing and grants. This assumption, however, is quite restrictive. It imposes a constant
marginal utility of income, as well as the same marginal utility of the public good for all
citizens, regardless of income. These restrictions limit the ability of the model to study
distributional issues, which may be relevant in some applications (Dixit et al., 1997).9
The local government funds the provision of the public good from two revenue sources:
a local tax on yi and a grant from the central government. Tax policy is not targeted
and hence the local tax rate τ ∈ (0, 1) is the same for all citizens. The local government
sets the tax rate and collects the tax revenue. In contrast, the decisions on grant funding
and allocation are made by the central government.
Collecting local taxes is costly. In particular, the local government faces an adminis-
trative cost of operating the tax system equal to ΓC(τ)y where Γ is a cost shifter and C(·)
is an increasing and convex function. ΓC(τ) ∈ (0, τ) to avoid a corner solution with zero
taxation. The administrative cost can represent, among others, the cost of processing
tax returns, monitoring tax evasion and the required legal proceeds, or the effort by the
public officer to enforce the tax system.
The assumption of increasing marginal costs C ′′ > 0 guarantees that there is an
optimal level of government spending and taxation. This assumption can be justified if
9This limitation is less of a concern in this paper since I only focus on the relation between collection
costs, grants and public spending. Hamilton (1986) uses a general utility function and, similarly to
this model, also finds that government spending is more responsive to grants in the presence of costly
taxation.
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the technology to collect taxes exhibits decreasing marginal returns.10
An alternative way to motivate costly tax collection is to include compliance costs. In
the rest of the model I will focus on administrative costs because they are more relevant
for the empirical case.11
From (1) and the previous definitions, we can write the indirect utility of citizen i as:
Vi = 1− τyi +H(g), (2)
while the local government’s budget constraint is
g = y [τ − ΓC(τ)] + a, (3)
where y is the local tax base and a is the lump-sum grant per capita. Note that the
expression R ≡ y [τ − ΓC(τ)] represents the net tax revenue.
Assumption 1 ΓC ′ < 1.
This assumption guarantees that the net tax revenue is an increasing function of the tax
rate.
Equilibrium policy Note that the citizen’s indirect utility (2) satisfies the single-
crossing property which allows us to use the median voter theorem. Thus, with credible
commitment and majority rule, the equilibrium policy g∗ would be the one that maximizes
the median citizen’s utility.
g∗ = arg max 1− τy +H(g). (4)
10Consider, for example, a tax authority that uses a Cobb-Douglas technology with both administrative
tools (A) and auditors’ labor (L) to collect a tax revenue of τ (note that this is equal to the tax rate
since total income is 1). Hence τ = TαL(1−α), with α < 1. The price of inputs A and L are 1 and w,
respectively. It is straightforward to show that, in the short run when A is fixed, the tax collection cost
is C(τ) = wτ
1
1−αA−
α
1−α +Aα. Note that the marginal cost of collecting taxes is increasing in τ .
11I also extend the model to allow for compliance costs. This extension is available from the author
upon request.
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Rearranging the budget constraint (3), we can express τ as a function of g:
F (τ) ≡ τ − ΓC(τ) = g − a
y
, (5)
where F ′ > 0, F ′′ < 0 by assumption 1 and convexity of C(τ). Since F is a monotonic
function, we can write the tax rate as
τ = f
(
g − a
y
)
, (6)
where f (·) = F−1 (·) and hence f ′ > 0, f ′′ > 0.
Solving (4) and using (6), we obtain the equilibrium policy:
g∗ = h(f ′
(
g∗ − a
y
)
), (7)
where h(·) is the inverse function of H ′(·). Note that h′ < 0 because H is concave.
2.1 Costless tax collection
Let us first study, as a benchmark, the case of costless tax collection. In this scenario,
expression (7) simplifies to g∗ = h (1) and it is easy to see that the effect of lump-sum
grants and local tax base on g∗ are both identical and equal to zero.12
When tax collection is costless, the model predicts that grants from the central gov-
ernment do not affect spending but instead are fully translated to citizens as tax rebates.
Moreover, the mechanism to transfer resources becomes irrelevant because both grants
and the local tax base are equivalent in terms of their effect on local government spending
and taxation.
This result replicates the veil hypothesis which has provided the theoretical basis for
the flypaper paradox (Oates, 1999, p. 1129). According to this hypothesis, when the
local authority is representative of the citizens, both lump-sum grants and the local tax
base have similar effects on local spending. Thus, the local government acts only as a
12This result is extreme due to the quasi-linearity assumption which eliminates the income effect.
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veil and does not distort the final allocation of resources.
2.2 Costly tax collection
Let us now relax the assumption of costless taxation. Taking total derivatives from
expression (7) we can calculate the propensities to spend out of the local tax base (y)
and grants:
dg∗
dy
= − h
′f ′′
y − h′f ′′
g∗ − a
y
, (8)
dg∗
da
= − h
′f ′′
y − h′f ′′ . (9)
Since h′ < 0, and f ′′ > 0, these propensities to spend are positive. Thus, in contrast
to the benchmark case, local spending increases both with the local tax base and grants
from the central government. The reason is that grants reduce the tax rate required
to fund a given level of spending. In turn, this lowers tax collection costs, reduces the
marginal cost of the public good and promotes additional spending.
Expressions (8) and (9) allow us to compare both marginal propensities to spend and
evaluate the magnitude of the flypaper effect. Using both results and definition (5), we
obtain:
dg∗
da
=
dg∗
dy
1
τ ∗ − ΓC(τ ∗) , (10)
where τ ∗ is the equilibrium tax rate and ΓC(τ ∗) is the administrative cost as a proportion
of the tax base.
Since ΓC(τ ∗) ∈ (0, τ ∗) and τ ∗ < 1, the marginal propensity to spend out of grants
is greater than the marginal propensity to spend out of the local tax base.13 Hence, the
model predicts that grants and the local tax base are not fungible. This prediction is
consistent with the observed flypaper effect and, contrary to the veil hypothesis, suggests
13Moreover, finding similar marginal propensities would be rare since it requires very high tax rates
and negligible collection costs.
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that these two sources of local revenue are not equivalent.
Similar to Hamilton (1986), the non-equivalence result is driven by the differences in
the cost of funds faced by the local government. In particular, a local government finds it
more costly to collect local taxes than to use grants from the central government. In the
model, this cost difference arises from the inability of the local government to internalize
the cost of funding the intergovernmental transfers. This result points out a potential
source of inefficiency: local governments may overspend if they do not take into account
the tax collection costs incurred by the central government.
2.3 Testable Predictions
In the empirical section, I follow Becker (1996) and use a double logarithmic specification.
This specification provides estimates of elasticities instead of propensities to spend. In
order to link the model to the empirical exercise, we can rewrite equation (10) in terms
of elasticities:
εa = εy
a
y
1
τ ∗ − ΓC(τ ∗) , (11)
εa = εy
a
g − a, (12)
where εa ≡ dgda ag and εy ≡ dgdy yg are the elasticities to spend out of grants and out of the
local tax base, respectively, and a
g−a is the ratio of grant to non-grant revenue.
From (11) and (12) it is straightforward to obtain the following testable predictions:
Prediction 1: the elasticity to spend out of grants increases with tax collection costs,
dεa
dΓ
> 0.
Prediction 2: the elasticity to spend out of grants decreases with the tax rate,
dεa
dτ
< 0.
Prediction 3: the elasticity to spend out of grants increases with the ratio of grant to
non-grant revenue,
dεa
d(a/(g − a)) = εy ≥ 0.
Note that predictions 2 and 3 provide alternative ways to explore the importance
of costly taxation using tax rates and the ratio of grant to non-grant revenue instead
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of measures of tax collection costs. This is possible because with costly taxation, tax
rates are inversely related to tax collection costs. In Section 5, I test empirically these
predictions in the context of Peruvian district municipalities.
3 Institutional Background
Peru is divided into three tiers of sub-national administrative units: departments, provinces
and districts. In the period of analysis, there were 24 departments, 194 provinces and
around 1650 districts. District municipalities are the lowest tier of autonomous sub-
national government. Their main responsibilities are the provision of local services -such
as waste collection, local police and civil registry- and development and maintenance of
local infrastructure. They, however, do not participate in the provision of education or
health services, and cannot redistribute cash directly to citizens.
Municipalities finance their budget mostly from two sources: local revenue (such as
local taxes, fees, fines and contributions) and transfers from the central government (see
Table 1). In the period 1999 to 2001, these two sources represented around 83 percent of
the total budget. The remaining budget corresponds mostly to debt, sales of assets and
the budget balance from previous years.14
3.1 Local revenue, and tax collection costs
The most important source of local revenue is the property tax (or impuesto predial). In
2001, this tax amounted to 80 percent of total local tax revenue.15
The property tax is levied on the estimated value of the real estate property. Local
governments, however, have little control over the tax rate and tax base. The tax rate is
defined by national law while the property value is calculated using criteria defined by a
national surveyor agency such as property size, quality and economic use. The amount
14Municipalities can roll forward any amount of local revenues or transfers not spent in a fiscal year.
15Other sources of local revenue include taxes to property sales, gambling and entertainment, fees
for waste management, parking, registry services or business licenses, as well as contributions to public
works and fines.
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Table 1: Aggregate Municipal Budget 1999-2001,
in millions of Nuevos Soles
Source Annual % total
Budget budget
A. Transfers 1065.8 44.6
Foncomun grant 718.9 30.1
Glass of Milk 228.4 9.5
Other transfersa 118.5 5.0
B. Local Revenue 924.8 38.7
Taxes 361.2 15.1
Service fees 496.2 20.7
Fines and contributions 67.4 2.8
C. Other Revenueb 328.2 13.7
D. Previous year balance 73.1 3.1
Total revenue 2391.9
Source: Municipalities’ budget reports.
a Includes tax-sharing of income tax of extractive indus-
tries and custom duties.
b Includes credit and capital income.
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actually collected, however, depends on the municipality’s monitoring and enforcement
effort.
A common form of tax evasion is the failure of owners to report improvements to
existing properties (which could increase the taxable base). To address this problem,
local tax authorities usually maintain a register of properties or cadaster, with details
about location, size and ownership of properties.
In the empirical analysis, I use the tenure of an updated cadaster as one of the proxies
of tax collection costs (see section 4.1 for further details on variables and data sources).
The rationale for using this proxy is twofold. First, the cadaster is recognized as a tool to
implement and operate property tax systems (United Nations, 2005; International Fed-
eration of Surveyors, 2005). In this view, an updated cadaster may reduce the collection
costs of the property tax. Second, it seems to capture an important dimension of tax
collection costs. For example, the local revenue per capita among municipalities with
an updated cadaster is 34 Nuevos Soles. In contrast, this figure among municipalities
without it is less than half, 15 Nuevos Soles.16
In addition, I also use, as a measure of tax collection costs, an indicator of tenure
of automated tax systems. In practice, this means having tax information -such as
the registry of tax payers and payment records- in electronic format, or access to tax
management software. In the sample, 23% of municipalities report having an updated
cadaster, while 7% report having an automated tax system.
These two measures are not without their problems.17 A first concern is that they
may fail to capture differences in actual tax collection costs. This measurement error
would create an attenuation bias. Second, they may just reflect other municipality char-
acteristics that also affect spending decisions. In that case, they would confound the
empirical analysis and lead to inconsistent estimates. I discuss these concerns in more
detail in Section 5.1.
16In the period of analysis, the average exchange rate was 3.46 Nuevos Soles = 1 US$.
17Ideally, I would like to use better estimates of tax collection costs such as spending in tax adminis-
tration or revenue offices. This information, however, is not available.
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3.2 The Foncomun grant
In addition to their own local revenue, district municipalities receive several transfers
from the central government (see Table 1). The most important is the Foncomun, an
equalization grant that represents around 30 percent of municipalities’ revenue.18 Other
transfers include the Glass of Milk (Vaso de Leche), a conditional grant earmarked to
a food support program, and sharing schemes of national taxes such as the income tax
of extractive industries and custom duties.19 I focus on the Foncomun because it is the
largest and most widespread transfer.
The Foncomun is an equalization grant allocated to all district municipalities. It is
the most important source of revenue for local governments. In the period 1999-2001, it
represented around 30 percent of total municipal budgets.
The Foncomun is funded with a fixed proportion of the national value added tax.
This tax is managed and collected by the central government without any intervention
by local governments. The central government defines the size of the total Foncomun
budget, based on tax revenue estimates.
Use During the period of analysis, the use of the Foncomun was partially conditional. In
particular, municipalities were required to spend at least 80 percent of the Foncomun on
capital expenditures. Capital expenditures are broadly defined and include expenditure
on durable assets, investment projects and related expenses such as feasibility studies
and consultancies. The Foncomun, however, is not earmarked to a particular project.
In practice, the compliance with this conditionality was limited. In aggregate, the
proportion of the Foncomun actually spent on capital expenditures decreased from 67
percent in 1998 to 54 percent in 2001. This evidence suggests that the Foncomun may
have been de facto treated as an unconditional grant. In 2003, the spending conditionality
was removed.
18Foncomun stands for Fondo de Compensacio´n Municipal or Municipal Compensation Fund.
19These transfers are assigned only municipalities in areas with natural resources or custom offices.
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Allocation formula The amount of Foncomun received on a given year does not de-
pend on the previous years’ spending performance. Similarly, there are no features that
would have made the Foncomun a matching-grant.20 Instead, the Foncomun is allocated
to all district municipalities using an allocation formula defined in national legislation.
In the period of analysis, the Foncomun allocation formula was proportional to pop-
ulation size and indicators of needs. The allocation was done in two steps. First, the
Foncomun was distributed among provinces based on population weighted by an index
of children mortality collected in 1981.21 Second, the amount assigned to each province
was shared among district municipalities based on a weighted measure of population size,
with double weight for rural population. This last step used data on urbanization rates
from the 1993 Population Census.22
This allocation procedure generates variation between municipalities and spatial cor-
relation within a province. In particular, the Foncomun per capita a municipality receives
depends of the province’s child mortality rate, and of the municipality’s urbanization rate
relative to the rest of municipalities in the same province.
The allocation formula reflects both the rationale of the Foncomun grant and the
data limitations in 1993, the year it was created. According to law, the Foncomun’s
should be distributed considering equalization and compensation criteria such as poverty,
demographics, and territory characteristics.23 In practice, however, at the moment of
creation of the transfer, there were no estimates of local poverty in Peru.24 This data
limitation may explain the use of child mortality and urbanization in the allocation
formula, instead of straight measures of poverty.
20With matching grants, the flypaper effect would just reflect the differences in prices of the public
good.
21A province is the administrative unit immediately above a district.
22There has been several changes to the allocation formula in 2002 and 2010. The current allocation
formula uses a richer, and updated, set of indicators of needs, poverty, and population. It also includes
indicators of local government’s performance such as relative size of capital expenditure and the ratio of
local taxes to total revenue.
23Ley de Tributacio`n Municipal (Municipal Tax Act) Art. 87.
24There were some estimates of poverty done in 1999 by Foncodes, a central government’s office, using
measures of infrastructure needs at district level. Only since 2003 there are annually-updated estimates
of poverty at the regional level. This data became available with the sample expansion of the Households
Living Standards Survey (ENAHO).
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There are two additional observations. First, changes in the allocation formula require
amendments to the national legislation. Hence, municipalities cannot, individually, affect
the allocation formula or weights. Second, in the period of analysis, the allocation weights
do not update the information on child mortality, only the estimates of population size.
These features reduce concerns of possible bargaining between municipalities and the
central government, or changes in Foncomun due to manipulation of reported data, both
possible sources of endogenous transfers.
The additional transfer In 2000 and 2001, the central government created a transi-
tory fund, called asignacio´n adicional or additional transfer, to increase the Foncomun
size.25
The fund was financed with the national budget and redistributed to municipalities
receiving a monthly Foncomun smaller than 25,000 Nuevos Soles (around US$7,300).
The extra amount transferred to a municipality was defined by law and was inversely
proportional to the calculated Foncomun grant (see Table 2). Note that the additional
transfer was a lump-sum not a grant per capita. For accounting and budgetary purposes,
the additional transfer was considered as part of the Foncomun grant.
Table 2: Allocation of additional transfer, in Nuevos Soles
Calculated Monthly
monthly Foncomun additional transfer
11,000 to 17,000 4,000
17,001 to 20,000 3,000
20,001 to 23,000 2,000
23,001 to 25,000 Variablea
a Difference between 25,000 and calculated
monthly Foncomun.
The additional transfer was in place from August 2000 to December 2001 and was as-
signed to around 60 percent of district municipalities. In practice, the additional transfer
benefited municipalities with small populations. These municipalities were supposed to
25This policy was a response to the decline in value added tax revenues, the main source of Foncomun’s
funding.
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receive a smaller total Foncomun but ended up receiving a larger amount. This implies
that their Foncomun per capita was greater than a comparable municipality with larger
population.
Table 3 compares socio-demographic characteristics of municipalities that received the
additional transfer to municipalities that did not. The variables are measured in 1999, a
year before the implementation of the additional transfer.26 Note that the main difference
between the two groups are population size, urbanization, density, and access to piped
water, but there are not significant differences in poverty rates.
Table 3: Socio-demographic characteristics in 1999
Received additional Mean
Variable transfer comparison
No Yes p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Population 23909.3 2446.3 0.000
(55460.6) (1728.2)
Population density 836.3 43.1 0.000
(3290.2) (328.9)
% urban population 38.3 43.3 0.003
(33.6) (27.3)
Poverty headcount 46.2 46.6 0.576
(15.7) (13.1)
% access piped water 58.8 65.8 0.000
(31) (33.8)
Nr. Municipalities 651 910
Note: Table reports unconditional means. Standard devia-
tions in parenthesis. Column (3) reports the p-value of the
test that the means of municipalities that received the addi-
tional transfer and did not received are equal.
The additional transfer created within-municipality variation in the Foncomun, in
addition to the variation between municipalities due to the allocation formula. In par-
ticular, municipalities that received the additional transfer experienced a faster growth
of the Foncomun. For example, in the period 1999 to 2001, the Foncomun per capita of
municipalities that received the additional transfer grew, on average, by 17.7 percent per
26I describe in more detail the data sources in Section 4.
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year. In contrast, the Foncomun of municipalities not entitled to the additional transfer
grew, on average, by 5 percent per year.
In the empirical section, I exploit this source of variation to estimate the elasticity of
spending out of grants and explore how it changes with measures of tax collection costs.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Data
I use a panel data set of 1,558 Peruvian district municipalities with information on annual
budgets, administrative resources and socio-demographic characteristics.27 The bud-
getary information covers three years (1999 to 2001) and comes from annual reports
prepared by the local governments. These reports have official status and are used for
national accounting and auditing by different government agencies 28. They include de-
tailed information on municipalities’ revenues and expenditures, including the amount
received from different transfers.29 I express the revenue and expenditure variables in per
capita values using population estimates for 1999.
I also collect data on the municipality’s administrative resources such as having an
updated cadaster -a register with details about location, size and ownership of properties-
or automated administrative systems. The data comes from surveys conducted in 1999
by the National Statistics Institute to assess the resources and capabilities of district
municipalities.30 The results of the survey were not intended to affect the transfers’
allocation or the implementation of other governmental programs. Participation in the
survey was compulsory for all district municipalities and the questionnaire was completed
by the local authority or a representative.
27The sample size is smaller than the universe of 1,650 municipalities due to lack of budgetary infor-
mation for some small municipalities.
28The budget reports I use correspond to the copy sent to the Ministry of Economy.
29I compared the amount of transfers registered in the budget reports with the records from the
Ministry of Economy -the office in charge of distributing the transfers- and I found similar values.
30The survey is called Registro Nacional de Municipalidades or the National Municipality Register. The
survey collects information about human resources, equipment, municipality services, local infrastructure
and current investment projects.
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I complement the dataset with socio-demographic variables from several sources. I
obtain measures of population density and percentage of urban population from the 1993
Population Census, as well as population estimates for 1999 from the National Statistics
Office. Poverty headcount and access to utilities are estimates for 1999 from Foncodes -a
central government’s office in charge of several anti poverty programs- and used for the
prioritization of public works and development projects.
Main variables I use the value of expenditure and Foncomun per capita as measures
of local spending (g) and grants (a), respectively. I also calculate the additional transfer
per capita. As I describe below, I use this variable as an instrument for Foncomun per
capita.
As proxies for tax collection costs, I use the tenure of tax administration tools. I focus
on two tools identified in the National Municipality Register: an updated cadaster and
automated tax systems.31
As discussed in Section 3, the choice of these proxies responds to the importance of
the cadaster to manage property tax systems, and the data limitations. I aggregate the
information of both measures of tax collection costs by constructing a dummy called high
cost equal to 1 if a municipality does not have an updated cadaster and an automated
tax system, and 0 otherwise.32 In terms of the model, high cost=1 represents a higher
value of Γ, the shifter of the tax collection cost. In the sample, around 75 percent of
municipalities are classified as high cost.
The model also predicts the differences in the grant elasticity of spending by the tax
rate (τ) and by the grant to non-grant ratio ( a
g−a) (predictions 2 and 3). These predictions
allow us to indirectly assess the importance of costly taxation, without directly observing
tax collection costs. As empirical counterparts of τ I use the average local revenue per
capita in 1998. This source of revenue includes local taxes, fees, contributions and fines
31Note that the category of municipalities without an updated cadaster include municipalities with an
outdated cadaster and without any cadaster.
32As a robustness check, I also report the results using the components of the dummy (having an
automated tax system or an updated cadaster) separately (see Table 8).
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collected directly by the municipality.33 As a proxy of a
g−a , I use the ratio of Foncomun
to non-Foncomun revenue in 1998.
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the main variables, and the p-values of a mean
comparison between low cost and high cost municipalities. There are three important
observations. First, municipalities classified as low cost have a higher value of own revenue
per capita, and a lower ratio of Foncomun to non-Foncomun revenue. This is consistent
with these municipalities actually facing lower tax collection costs, and hence being able
to collect more local taxes.
Second, while having similar levels of expenditure per capita, high cost municipalities
receive a higher Foncomun per capita, and hence have a larger ratio of Foncomun to
expenditure (proxy of a
g
). This raises concerns that differences in grant elasticities may
be driven mechanically by differences in the relative contribution of Foncomun to total
expenditure.34 In the empirical section, I address this concern by using the different ratios
for high and low cost municipalities to transform the grant elasticities into propensities
to spend, and by estimating these propensities directly using a linear model.
Finally, there are systematic differences between both types of municipalities. High
cost municipalities have smaller populations, they are less urban, less dense and poorer.
These systematic differences between low and high cost municipalities raise relevant con-
cerns that I discuss in Section 5.1.
4.2 Econometric Specification
The purpose of the empirical exercise is to estimate the grant elasticity of spending (εa)
and evaluate how it varies with tax collection costs. To do so, I estimate the following
baseline regression:
ln git = β0 ln ait + β1(ln ait × high costi) + ηi + it, (13)
33I also use alternative proxies such as the local tax per capita in 1998 and the property tax per capita
in year 2001, the only year available. The results, not reported, are similar.
34Note that εa =
dg
da
a
g .
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Table 4: Summary Statistics and Mean Comparison
Tax collection cost Mean
Variable Total Low High comparison
cost cost p-value
Model counterparts
Expenditure per capita (g) 165.3 171.6 163.2 0.062
(124.9) (128.3) (123.7)
Foncomun per capita (a) 100.2 87.0 104.5 0.000
(86.5) (78.9) (88.4)
Foncomun/Expenditure (a
g
) 0.623 0.545 0.649 0.000
(0.206) (0.239) (0.187)
Own revenue per capita 23.3 44.9 15.5 0.000
in 1998 (τ) (79.9) (132.8) (46.1)
Foncomun/Non Foncomun 2.1 1.5 2.3 0.000
revenue in 1998 ( a
g−a) (2.2) (1.5) (2.4)
Tax collection costs
No updated cadaster 76.5 16.9 100.0 0.000
(42.4) (37.5) (0)
No automated tax system 92.5 69.9 100.0 0.000
(26.4) (45.9) (0)
District characteristics
% received additional transfer 57.0 44.7 61.1 0.000
(49.5) (49.8) (48.8)
Population 11711.4 23874.3 7641.1 0.000
(37967.7) (63512.5) (22605.8)
Population density 383.9 1125.1 134.2 0.000
(2205.1) (3914.2) (1049.8)
% urban population 41.2 50.5 38.0 0.000
(30.3) (34) (28.2)
Poverty headcount 46.4 41.6 48.1 0.000
(14.3) (15.9) (13.3)
% access piped water 62.8 60.8 63.5 0.190
(32.8) (32.4) (32.9)
Nr observations 4144 1021 3123
Nr. Municipalities 1558 376 1182
Notes: Table reports unconditional means. Standard deviation are in parentheses.
The last column reports the p-value of the test that the means of high and low cost
municipalities are equal.
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where git is the expenditure per capita of municipality i in year t, ait is the amount of
Foncomun per capita and high costi is the indicator of having high collection costs.
Following Becker (1996), I use a double logarithmic specification. This functional form
reduces concern of flypaper due to mis-specification and produces estimates of elasticities
instead of propensities to spend. I also check the robustness of the main results using a
linear specification. In addition, I cluster the standard errors by year and province. This
clustering accounts for the possible correlation within provinces due to the Foncomun
allocation procedure.
The interaction term (ln ait × high costi) captures differences in the grant elasticity
of spending by tax collection costs. Note that in this specification β̂0 and β̂0 + β̂1 are
the estimated grant elasticity of spending for municipalities with low and high collection
costs, respectively. The model predicts that εa is increasing in tax collection costs, which
implies β̂1 > 0.
A main concern when estimating equation (13) is the presence of omitted variables
correlated both with Foncomun and expenditure per capita. This may arise, for example,
if municipalities with unobservable greater propensities to spend also receive a larger
Foncomun per capita.
The identification strategy addresses this concern in two ways. First, the baseline
regression includes municipality fixed effects ηi. This procedure exploits within mu-
nicipality variation driven by the growth over time of the Foncomun budget, and the
additional transfer distributed in late 2000 and 2001. Moreover, it allow us to control for
time-invariant heterogeneity that may bias the regression estimates such as the observed
demographic differences in Table 4, or unobserved differences such as the long-run level
of income, or size of tax base.
Second, I use the additional transfer per capita (add transferit) as an instrument for
the Foncomun per capita. As an instrument for the interaction term ln ait × high costi I
use ln(add transferit)× high costi. I estimate this regression using panel data with fixed
effects and instrumental variables. In this specification, the identification assumption is
that the changes in the additional transfer are related to changes in expenditure only
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through changes in the Foncomun.
5 Main results
Table 5 presents the main results. Column 1 estimates the baseline regression (13) includ-
ing municipality fixed effects. Column 2 estimates the 2SLS model using add transfer as
an instrument for Foncomun per capita.35 Using both methods, the parameter associated
with the interaction term (β̂1) is positive and significant. This result suggests that the
grant elasticity of spending (εa) is significantly larger for municipalities with high tax
collection costs.
I obtain similar results using a linear model (columns 3 and 4). This specification
might lead to overestimation of the flypaper effect (Becker, 1996), but produces direct
estimates of the propensity to spend out of grants (dg
da
). Note that in both cases, the
estimated dg
da
is significantly larger for high cost municipalities. For example, in column 3
the estimated dg
da
for a low cost municipality is 0.736 while for a high cost is 0.956, a value
almost 30 percent larger. These results are consistent with the model predictions that
grants have a greater stimulatory effect in localities with costlier taxation (prediction 1).
As a reference, the middle rows of Table 5 display the implied dg
da
and their 95% con-
fidence interval. For columns 3 and 4, these figures are obtained directly from the linear
model. In contrast, for columns 1 and 2, I need to transform the estimated elasticities
into propensities. I do so by dividing them by the average ratio of Foncomun to total
expenditure. Note that the implied propensities to spend are large, with values rang-
ing from 0.52 to 1.16. These estimates, however, are within the ranges reported in the
literature (Hines and Thaler, 1995).
The previous results only suggest that, consistent with Hamilton’s (1986) model,
costly taxation increase the responsiveness of local spending to grants. In general, how-
35There are two instruments: one the for variable in level and the other for the interaction term. The
system is just identified, which reduces concern of weak instrument bias. The first stage, not reported,
confirms that the excluded instruments are significantly, and positively, correlated to the endogenous
variables. The multivariate F statistics of excluded instruments, suggested by Angrist and Pischke
(2009) in the case of multiple instruments, are 23.9 and 93.7, respectively.
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ever, I cannot say anything about the magnitude of the flypaper effect or the contribution
of costly taxation to explain this phenomenon. To do so, I would need an estimate of
the propensity to spend out of income, dg
dy
. In the case I study, I cannot estimate this
propensity due to the lack of information on income, or tax base, at municipal level.
We can make some progress, however, by assuming a similar value of dg
dy
for high and
low cost municipalities. Under that assumption, the previous results can be interpreted as
evidence that costly taxation partially explains the flypaper effect. A back of the envelope
calculation, taking the most conservative estimate of dg
da
and assuming dg
dy
= 0.10, suggests
that the observed differences in tax collection costs account for around 20% of the flypaper
effect.36
Exploring additional model predictions A concern with the previous results is that
the measure of tax collection costs may fail to capture actual cost differences. To address
this issue, I exploit the model’s additional predictions.
Recall that, in the presence of costly taxation, the model predicts that: (i) elasticity
of spending out of grants (εa) decreases with the tax rate, and (ii) εa increases with the
ratio of grant to non-grant revenue ( a
g−a).
37 These predictions suggest alternative ways
to explore the role of costly taxation without directly measuring tax collection costs.
To do so, I estimate the baseline regression replacing high by measures of the tax rate
and a
g−a . Table 6 shows the results. Column 1 and 2 replace high cost by the log of the
own revenue per capita in 1998, a proxy for the tax rate and estimate the model using
OLS and 2SLS. The estimated parameter associated to the interaction term is negative
and significant. Columns 3 and 4 instead use the ratio of Foncomun to non-Foncomun
revenue in 1998, a proxy for a
g−a . In this case, the estimated β1 is positive. These findings
are consistent with the model (predictions 2 and 3). Moreover, they provide additional
support to the claim that tax collection costs are relevant to explain differences in the
360.10 corresponds to the upper bound of estimated dgdy in the literature (Hines and Thaler, 1995). I
use the ratio dg/gadg/dy , proposed by Becker (1996), as a measure of the magnitude of the flypaper effect.
37Intuitively, we can use tax rates and ag−a because, in equilibrium, high cost municipalities would
have lower tax rates, and higher dependence on grants.
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Table 5: Main results
Ln(expenditure per capita) Expenditure per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Foncomun per 0.321*** 0.591***
capita) (0.053) (0.072)
Ln(Foncomun per 0.168*** 0.136**
capita)× high cost (0.058) (0.056)
Foncomun per 0.736*** 0.921***
capita (0.094) (0.120)
Foncomun per 0.220** 0.212*
capita × high cost (0.104) (0.114)
Implied dg/da
dg/da low cost 0.515 0.948 0.736 0.921
[0.347-0.684] [0.722-1.174] [0.55-0.921] [0.684-1.157]
dg/da high cost 0.785 1.166 0.956 1.133
[0.665-0.904] [0.986-1.346] [0.798-1.114] [0.955-1.31]
Estimation method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Observations 4,035 4,035 4,035 4,035
Nr municipalities 1,449 1,449 1,449 1,449
R-squared 0.276 0.257 0.305 0.299
Notes: Robust errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by province and
year. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All columns include municipality fixed
effects and a time trend. High cost is a dummy equal to 1 if municipality does not
have an updated cadaster or an automated tax system. Column 2 uses ln(add transfer)
and ln(add transfer)×high as excluded instruments. Column 3 uses the same variables
but in levels. Implied dg/da calculated using the average ratio Foncomun/Expenditure.
95% confidence interval is in brackets below the calculated propensities.
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response of local spending to grants.
Table 6: Testing additional model predictions
Ln(expenditure per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Foncomun per capita) 0.520*** 0.723*** 0.369*** 0.596***
(0.034) (0.062) (0.046) (0.084)
Ln(Foncomun per capita) × -0.046*** -0.042**
Ln(own revenue per capita 1998) (0.016) (0.018)
Ln(Foncomun per capita) × 0.033*** 0.025*
Foncomun/Non-Foncomun 1998 (0.010) (0.014)
Estimation method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Observations 3,308 3,308 3,378 3,378
Nr municipalities 1,176 1,176 1,201 1,201
R-squared 0.256 0.242 0.256 0.242
Notes: Robust errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by province and
year. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All columns include municipality
fixed effects and a time trend. Columns 2 and 4 use ln(add transfer) as an instrument
for ln(Foncomun per capita).
5.1 Additional checks
As previously mentioned, there are systematic differences between municipalities with
low and high tax collection cost. High cost municipalities tend to have smaller, less dense
and more rural populations. To the extent that these variables only affect the level of
spending, their effect is controlled by including the municipality fixed effect.
A main concern, however, is that the measure of tax collection costs may just reflect
these systematic differences. In that case, the estimated β̂1 might capture differences in
grant elasticities attributed to these other factors, not to tax collection costs.
I address this concern twofold. First, I include full interactions of ln(Foncomun per
capita) with observables such as population size, density, poverty headcount and access
to piped water. This procedure effectively accounts for differences in grant elasticities
related to these observable factors. If the variable high cost is just picking up these
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municipality features, the estimates of β1 should become insignificant when including
these interaction terms.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 display the results using the panel data with fixed ef-
fects and the instrumental variable approach. In both cases, findings are similar to the
baseline regressions: the grant elasticity of spending is increasing in tax collection costs.
Interestingly, the estimates also suggest that municipalities with smaller populations are
more responsive to grants. This may reflect a larger marginal benefit of public spending.
Second, I perform a falsification test using the Glass of Milk transfer. In contrast to the
Foncomun, the Glass of Milk transfer is fully earmarked to a food assistance program This
food program is supported by the central government but managed locally. Since local
governments cannot use this revenue to fund other expenditures, we should not expect
any differential spending response by tax collection costs. A significant difference would
be indicative that the measure of collection costs is picking up another municipality’s
characteristic which affects public spending.38
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7 show the results of this falsification test. In both cases,
I add ln(Glass of Milk per capita) and its interaction with the measure of tax collection
costs. Note that the grant elasticity of spending of the Foncomun is still increasing in
tax collection costs. In contrast, the elasticity of spending of the Glass of Milk is not
different between low and high cost municipalities.
Finally, I check the robustness of the results to alternative ways to construct the mea-
sure of tax collection costs. Recall that, in the baseline regression, I classify a municipality
as high cost if it lacks both an updated cadaster and an automated tax system.
First, I estimate the baseline regression (13) using both measures of administrative
tools separately. Columns 1 to 4 in Table 8 display the results. Columns 1 and 2
replace the dummy high cost by no cadaster. This variable indicates lack of an updated
cadaster only. Columns 3 and 4 use an indicator of lack of an automated tax system (no
automated). Note that the results using no cadaster are similar to the baseline results. In
contrast, the results become insignificant when using no automated. This suggests that
38For example, unobserved technical capability or citizen’s preference for public spending.
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Table 7: Additional checks
Ln(expenditure per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Foncomun per capita) 1.303*** 1.275*** 0.288*** 0.554***
(0.435) (0.396) (0.058) (0.082)
Ln(Foncomun per capita) 0.126** 0.117** 0.169*** 0.137**
× high cost (0.059) (0.057) (0.064) (0.067)
Ln(Glass of Milk 0.129*** 0.099***
per capita) (0.033) (0.029)
Ln(Glass of Milk 0.012 0.016
per capita) × high cost (0.033) (0.040)
Ln(Foncomun per capita) -0.129*** -0.121***
× ln(population) (0.040) (0.033)
Ln(Foncomun per capita) 0.079 0.245
× poverty headcount (0.278) (0.349)
Ln(Foncomun per capita) 0.033*** -0.065
× population density (0.010) (0.045)
Ln(Foncomun per capita) -0.041 -0.074
× % urban population (0.090) (0.102)
Ln(Foncomun per capita) 0.054 0.045
× % piped water (0.046) (0.049)
Estimation method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Observations 3,973 3,973 4,035 4,035
Nr. municipalities 1,425 1,425 1,449 1,449
R-squared 0.288 0.278 0.288 0.270
Notes: Robust errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by province and
year. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All columns include municipality fixed
effects and a time trend. Columns 2 and 4 use ln(add transfer) as an instrument for
ln(Foncomun per capita).
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combining both measures, as in the baseline regression, may produce more conservative
results.
The insignificant result in columns 3 and 4 may be due to the lack of variation in
the variable no automated. In the sample, 92.5% of municipalities lack an automated
tax system. This lack of variation may make the estimates less stable and noisier. To
evaluate this, I replicate Table 8 using a more parsimonious specification. In particular,
I replace municipality fixed effects by department fixed effects. The results, displayed in
Table 9 in the Appendix, are similar to the ones obtained using the baseline specification.
Second, I move towards a more continuous measure of tax collection costs. To do so, I
use the number of tax administration tools the municipality lacks (high number). This is
a discrete variable that ranges from 0 to 2. Columns 5 and 6 in Table 8 show the results
using this variable instead of the dummy high cost. Note that the results are similar to
the baseline regression.
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6 Conclusion
This paper explores empirically the effect of costly local taxation on the responsiveness
of local governments to grants from the central government. Using the case of Peruvian
district municipalities, I find robust evidence that grants have a greater stimulatory effect
on the spending of local governments with higher tax collection costs -measured by the
lack of administrative tools.
These findings provide empirical support to the argument that costly taxation par-
tially explains the flypaper effect. In this view, grant recipients may be more responsive
to increases in transfers because they are perceived as marginally cheaper than other
revenue sources. This argument may also be relevant to explain the lack of fungibility of
grants and local revenue in other contexts, such as development aid.
The model also points out to a potential source of inefficiency associated to fiscal
decentralization. In particular, local governments may consider grants as cheaper sources
of revenue, because they may fail to internalize the cost of funding the transfer scheme.
In this case, local spending would be higher than optimal and the flypaper effect would
be a symptom of overspending at local level.
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- APPENDIX NOT FOR PUBLICATION -
A Model extensions
A.1 Asymmetric income distribution
In the baseline model I assume a symmetric distribution of the type yi. Let us relax this
assumption and consider a more general case. Denote the median and average yi are ym
and y, respectively. Also let us define the ratio k ≡ ym
y
. I assume that k can be affected
by changes on average yi and that 0 < k < 1. In this setup k captures the degree of
inequality between the average taxpayer and the median voter. The rest of the setup is
the same.
With this modification, the government’s budget constraint remains the same, g =
y [τ − ΓC(τ)] + a, and the tax rate can still be written as τ = f(g−a
y
). However the
equilibrium policy becomes
g∗ = arg max 1− τym +H(g)
because the politician maximizes the median voter’s indirect utility.
Solving the maximization problem we can rewrite the equilibrium policy as:
g∗ = h(kf ′(
g − a
y
)) (14)
Recall that h′ < 0 and thus the level of public spending decreases with income inequality
k.
Taking total derivatives to (14) we obtain the propensities to spend out of local income
and grants:
dg∗
dy
=
yk′h′f ′
y − kh′f ′′ −
kh′f ′′
y − kh′f ′′
g∗ − a
y
dg∗
da
= − kh
′f ′′
y − kh′f ′′
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From these two expressions and definition (5) we can relate both propensities to spend
to obtain the magnitude of the flypaper effect:
dg∗
da
=
dg∗
dy
(−k
′
k
f ′
f ′′
y + τ − ΓC(τ))−1 (15)
Note that, similar to the case of symmetric income distribution, the magnitude of
the flypaper effect is increasing on the administrative costs shifter Γ. Moreover, in the
particular case when the income distribution is unaffected by changes on average income,
k′ = 0, expression (15) becomes identical to (10).
A.2 Compliance and administrative costs
Consider a more general case with both compliance and administrative costs. In par-
ticular, for citizen i the compliance cost is ΓcCc(τ)yi while for the tax authority the
administrative cost represents a proportion ΓaCa(τ) of the tax base. Both ΓcCc(τ) and
ΓaCa(τ) are increasing and convex functions and adopt values strictly between 0 and τ .
Given the previous assumptions, we can re-write equations (2) and (3) as
Vi = 1− yi[τ + ΓcCc(τ)] +H(g)
g = y [τ − ΓaCa(τ)] + a
Rearranging the budget constraint, we can express τ as a function of g:
F (τ) ≡ τ − ΓaCa(τ) = g − a
y
(16)
where F ′ > 0, F ′′ < 0 by assumption 1 and convexity of Ca(τ). Since F is a monotonic
function, we can write the tax rate as
τ = f
(
g − a
y
)
where f (·) = F−1 (·).
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It follows that the median citizen’s indirect utility can be written as
1− y [f + ΓcCc(f)] +H(g) (17)
The maximization of equation 17 with respect to g provides the level of public spending
in equilibrium;
g∗ = h((1 + ΓcC ′c)f
′) (18)
where h(·) is the inverse function of H ′(·).
Calculating comparative statics from (18), we obtain:
dg∗
dy
= − h
′A
y − h′A
g∗ − a
y
(19)
dg∗
da
= − h
′A
y − h′A (20)
where A = (1 + ΓcC
′
c)f
′′ + f ′f ′ΓcC ′′c
From visual inspection of (19) and (20), and using definition (16), we obtain the
following relation between both propensities to spend:
dg∗
da
=
dg∗
dy
1
τ − ΓaCa(τ) (21)
Note that the magnitude of the flypaper effect is similar to the obtain in the case without
compliance costs. However, the propensities to spend are different.
Note that in the special case of no administrative costs, Γc = 0, expression (21)
becomes:
dg∗
da
=
dg∗
dy
1
τ ∗
Similar to the model only with administrative costs, this extension predicts a propensity
to spend out of grants larger than the propensity to spend out of local income.
B Additional empirical results
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